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Abstract: In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more
generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the
formal organizations and institutions that help dene and enforce property rights,
and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential disputes. We examine
the eects of these two factors in a simple static contest model, in which two sides
choose levels of arming and whether to engage in actual con
ict or settle in the
shadow of con
ict. We show how arming critically depends on both governance and
norms, and therefore how societies with potentially con
ictual relations can make
either high or low levels of expenditures on security without any dierence in the
levels of security they actually enjoy. We also explore how investments in governance
can reduce arming.
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Military expenditures dier widely across countries, ranging from less than 1 percent
to more than 10 percent of GDP (see SIPRI, 2008). Are the relatively high expen-
ditures observed in some countries inherently necessary? That is, does the security
of these countries require such high expenditures, or is it somehow possible for these
countries to reduce their military expenditures without essentially changing the level
of security that they enjoy?
In a similar vein but considering security within countries, are the costs of crime,
incarceration, policing and enforcement always socially necessary? Why would one
country have less crime and, at the same time, fewer costs for its control compared
with another country?
In the four decades before World War I, German and French forces were repeat-
edly confronting one another across their common border. Yet, since World War II,
nothing of the sort has been necessary. Now the border is freely crossed without any
checks. Both the German and French economies have beneted, perhaps immensely
so, from these more recent arrangements since a signicant percentage of their re-
spective incomes is no longer expended on non-productive defense expenditures and
can instead be channelled to consumption and productive investment. But, what
accounts for such a dramatic change in posture?
One would suspect that \institutions"|various formal and informal arrangements
that can mediate con
ict and lead to more ecient social outcomes|are somehow
responsible (see, for example, North, 1990). Similarly, but not equivalently, in a
\Nirvana" or a \cross-my-heart" society (Schelling, 1960) where crossing one's heart
implies perfect commitment, one can have perfect security without expending any
resources on enforcement. Such a level of security, however, would be dicult to
achieve in a Hobbesian polity regardless of the amount of enforcement expenditures
made. Moreover, with such expenditures included in measured GDP, it might appear
that the Hobbesian polity is better o than the \cross-my-heart" society despite the
latter's much higher level of security and possibly higher overall welfare. Actual
economies and societies fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Nevertheless,
enforcement costs and security expenditures can vary widely even across these more
moderate cases.
In this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally,
1the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance and norms. We refer
to governance as, roughly, the formal organizations and institutions that help dene
and enforce property rights. In domestic settings these include courts, regulatory
and enforcement agencies, and the police. In transnational settings, governance
refers to organizations and institutions that mediate and govern disputes. In the case
of France and Germany, transnational governance started with the Steel and Coal
Union of the late 1940s that evolved into the European Economic Community and
later into the European Union. As these organizations evolved, the scope for disputes
between France and Germany became ever more narrow; and, in some ways, such
disputes became domestic rather than transnational, since some domestic sovereignty
was relinquished in favor of European-Union-wide laws and institutions.
We refer to norms as the informal arrangements in settling potential disputes. The
\cross-my-heart" society is one such norm. Its main attribute for the contexts we are
concerned with is that arming and other enforcement measures would be completely
unnecessary. At the other extreme, we consider a norm according to which the sole
determinant of settling disputes is the relative amount of arms (or other enforcement
measure) made by the contenders.
We examine the eect of governance and norms in a simple static contest model, in
which two sides choose levels of arming as well as whether to engage in actual con
ict
or to settle in the shadow of con
ict. We show how arming critically depends on
both governance and norms, and therefore how societies with potentially con
ictual
relations can make either high or low levels of expenditures on security without any
dierence in the levels of security they actually enjoy.
Moreover, the level of governance itself can be considered a collective good that
depends on the building of formal institutions and organizations; as such, it can be
thought of as being endogenous in the long run, just as it has been in the case of
France and Germany. We thus discuss and formally demonstrate how investments in
governance reduce arming.
Our analysis combines various features related to con
ict found in prior work
but not yet combined. The two most directly relevant for comparison are Anbarci,
Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2002) and McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas (2011). The
former paper examines various bargaining norms under the threat of con
ict, but does
not distinguish between secure and insecure income. The latter distinguishes between
secure and insecure income arising from governance quality, but does not consider
2dierent bargaining norms. Our paper combines both governance and norms.1
In what follows, we present the basic model that allows us to explore the deter-
minants of dierential security costs. Next, we characterize the equilibrium choices
of arming and whether to ght or to settle. We then turn to study the endoge-
nous determination of governance. We conclude with some broader discussion of the
implications of our analysis, including possible avenues for further research.
2 Governance and Norms in a Contest for Income
Consider two parties, labelled A and B, together having a total (gross) income of
Y: Suppose A holds secure possession of A portion of that income, whereas B's
secure share is B: As such, a share   A + B 2 [0;1] of total income is secure
and thus not subject to dispute. If the parties reside within the same country, the
security of that income can be viewed as being guaranteed by the state. If the parties
are located in dierent countries or if they are countries themselves, security could
emanate from practically enforceable international law, the international collective
security arrangements that have prevailed in the post-war period, or through other
bilateral and multilateral agreements. We think of that sort of security as being due
to \governance," supported by the state's formal institutions (e.g., laws, courts and
policy).
The remaining income, (1 )Y; is insecure, contestable by the two parties through
arming. Let gi denote arming by party i = A;B. One possibility is that the two
parties ght outright for this income, as in a winner-take-all contest. Assuming that
some fraction of the contested income, 1    2 (0;1), is destroyed when the parties
ght, only (1 )Y is left to the winner. The loser receives none of the contestable
income. Depending on the amount of arming by each side, party i's probability of




gA+gB if gA + gB > 0;
1
2 if gA + gB = 0;
(1)
for i = A;B. This specication implies that each party's probability of winning is
1More generally, as discussed below, our paper ts into the literature on bargaining and con
ict
with arming under complete information (see, for example, Fearon, 1995; Garnkel and Skaperdas,
2000; and, Powell, 2006).
3increasing in his own arms, but at a decreasing rate; furthermore, it is decreasing in




i (gA;gB) = iY +
gi
gA + gB
(1   )Y   gi; (2)
for i = A;B.
However, the two parties need not ght outright. We consider an alternative
possibility|namely, \peaceful" settlement, in which the two players agree to a divi-
sion of the contested income, and in doing so avoid the destructive eects of ghting.
Each party's share of the contested income under settlement, denoted by vi, again




i (gA;gB) = 
gi
gA + gB
+ (1   )1
2; (3)
for i = A;B, where  2 [0;1]. This class of rules includes the following three possi-
bilities:
(i) When  = 0, the contested income is divided in half regardless of each side's
choice of guns (as in a \cross-my-heart" society).
(ii) When  = , the contested income is divided according to any symmetric
axiomatic bargaining solution (including the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky so-
lutions) where the disagreement payos are those under ghting.2
(iii) When  = 1, the contested income is divided solely on the basis of the two
sides' relatives holdings of arms, such that each side's share is given by what
would be his probability of winning (pA =
gA
gA+gB and pB =
gB
gA+gB) if the two
were to ght.
More generally, we think of the rule of division and, in particular, the value of 
as re
ecting norms, the sensitivity of the rule of division to arming and, by extension,
2In contrast to the setting of Anbarci, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2002) where the Pareto frontier
is strictly convex, the Pareto frontier in the present setting is linear; as such, all axiomatic bargaining
solutions in this analysis collapse to the case where  = :
4the degree of commitment the two parties have in settling disputes without resorting
to arms. The smaller is the value of , the stronger is that degree of commitment and
the less important are the players' rst-stage choice of guns. For any given  2 [0;1],
the two parties' incomes under settlement are as follows:
y






+ (1   )1
2

(1   )Y   gi; (4)
for i = A;B.
We are agnostic here about the origin of these norms. We treat them as paramet-
rically given. Obviously, history and third party in
uences are two possible sources.
A society with a prior history of much warfare and violence might be expected to
place more emphasis on arming as a rule of division. By contrast, a society with
a long history of peace and cooperation might place little or even no emphasis on
arming. How the rest of the world behaves is another source of in
uence, since such
rules can be contagious across societies. It would seem that, in the post-World War
II period in particular, there has been a fairly potent norm against the changing of
borders through violent means or even against the mere threat of violence. Arguably,
this norm has reduced arming as well as the number of international wars compared
to previous historical periods.3
To summarize, we consider the following sequence of moves:
Stage 1. Parties A and B choose their costly levels of arming, gA and gB.
Stage 2. Given the arming choices made in stage one, each side decides whether (i)
to ght, taking all of the insecure income that remains after destruction with the
probability as specied in equation (1) or (ii) to settle, dividing the contested
income according equation (3). Whereas settlement requires both parties to
agree to the rule (3), ghting arises if just one chooses to ght.
As in prior work on con
ict and bargaining (for example, Fearon, 1995; Garnkel
and Skaperdas, 2000; Powell, 2006; and more recently McBride, Milante and Skaper-
das, 2011), when con
ict breaks out, it is not due to misperceptions about the parties'
relative strength or any tactical advantages one party might have in information. Like
3See Leeson and Coyne (2011) for a discussion of the emergence of norms. They argue that norms
are more likely to emerge precisely when formal institutions of governance are lacking. For in such
settings their potential benets are greater.
5the settings studied in this literature, there is complete information here. In this prior
work, the outbreak of con
ict is attributed to the combination of two factors: (i) the
inability of the parties to commit to or enforce long-term contracts on arming; and
(ii) the eect of current con
ict to give the victor a strategic advantage in future
con
ict. But, because the setting of the present analysis is static, we are abstracting
from this second factor. The outbreak of con
ict arises in this setting solely due to
the parties' inability to commit to their choices of arming and whether to settle or to
ght.
In any case, the distinction we make here between secure and insecure income
allows us to examine the potential for partial but imperfect enforcement. At the
same time, our consideration of the class of rules in equation (3) allows us to examine
the implications of various norms to settle disputes.
In the next section, we derive the equilibrium choices of the two parties. Our focus
will be on Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE), where each party is able to anticipate
the ght-or-settle decision when arming in stage 1. This equilibrium concept is widely
used for sequential games of imperfect but complete information such as in this model.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Given the amount of arming by each party, gA and gB, along with the settlement
incomes in (4) and the expected con
ict incomes in (2), party i will choose to settle
if and only if v

i (gA;gB)  pi(gA;gB) for i = A;B. Using equations (1) and (3), this
condition becomes
1




for i = A;B. Because ghting is destructive ( < 1) for any given choice of guns
(gA;gB) there exists a range of possible division rules (3) parametrized by  that
satisfy the condition in (5) for both parties. Indeed, focusing on symmetric outcomes
in arming (gA = gB) so that pA = pB = 1
2, we see immediately that the condition
in equation (5) is satised for any  2 [0;1]. However, as we show in this section, a
symmetric SPE with settlement need not exist for all possible rules of division shown
in equation (3). But, rst we derive the symmetric equilibrium outcome of the contest
under ghting.
63.1 Fighting
Assuming that one of the two parties chooses to ght in the second stage, the other
party's second-stage choice is inconsequential. Accordingly, both players choosing to
ght can always be sustained in an SPE. The expected incomes shown in equation
(2) constitute a well-dened game conditional on ghting in the second stage. The












(gA + gB)2(1   )Y   1 = 0; (6)
for i = A;B. At an interior optimum, each player balances the marginal benet of
arming, which is increasing in the amount of insecure income net of destruction from
ghting ((1   )Y ), against arming's marginal cost.4
Focussing on symmetric outcomes, these conditions imply the following solutions







4(1   )Y: (7)





f) = iY + 1
4(1   )Y i = A;B: (8)
As revealed by these solutions, the symmetric SPE arming levels are increasing in
the degree of insecurity (1   ). Since such expenditures are unavailable for con-
sumption or other purposes and thus are costly, the sum of the parties' SPE expected
incomes is decreasing in 1   .5 Furthermore, while an increase in the destructive
eects of ghting (1   ) reduces equilibrium arming, the direct, negative eect of
the destruction dominates, implying that expected incomes are decreasing in 1   .
4Note that gA = gB = 0 can be ruled out as an equilibrium. In particular, given that one player
(i) chooses gi = 0, the other player (j) can seize all of the undestroyed, contestable income with
probability equal to one, by choosing an innitesimally small but strictly positive amount of guns.
Of course, player i recognizes this possibility and thus will not choose gi = 0.
5If, for example, the increase in security is equally distributed to the two parties (di = 1
2d),
then each side's expected income will rise as  rises.
73.2 Settlement
The settlement incomes in (4), given the specic division rule in equation (3), con-













(gA + gB)2(1   )Y   1 = 0; (9)
for i = A;B. These necessary conditions balance the marginal benet of arming,
which depends positively on  as well as the income up for grabs ((1 )Y ), against
the marginal cost of arming.6
Again, focusing on symmetric outcomes, these conditions imply the following so-







4(1   )Y; (10)





) = iY + 1
4(2   )(1   )Y i = A;B: (11)
Note how both gun choices and equilibrium incomes under settlement depend
on the security or governance parameter  and on the rule of division or \norm"
parameter . If either all property is secure ( = 1) or guns play no role in the
division of insecure income ( = 0), no guns are chosen and incomes are maximal.
As property becomes more insecure (i.e.,  falls) or as more weight is attached to the
disagreement point in bargaining (i.e.,  rises), more resources are expended on guns
and less income is left for consumption.
However, as we shall now see, settlement need not be an SPE for all values of the
norm parameter, . In particular, to verify that each player choosing the strategy g
and settlement is an SPE, we must rule out possible unilateral deviations. There are
three to consider. The rst is for one party (i) to set gi 6= g in the rst stage and
to choose settlement in the second. However, since conditional on settlement, g is
the Nash equilibrium of the single-period arming decision, we can easily rule out this
6The reasoning outlined above in footnote 4 for why gA;gB > 0, applies here as well when  > 0.
8deviation.
The second possible deviation is for one player (i) to set gi = g like the opponent
in the rst stage, but to choose to ght in the second stage. In view of the deviating
party's choice to ght, ghting will take place. Comparing the expected incomes
from choosing peace and choosing settlement in the second stage, conditional on
both parties choosing g in the rst stage, shows that this deviation can be ruled out
provided that
iY + 1
2(1   )Y > iY + 1
2(1   )Y:
But, since ghting destroys some of the insecure part of Y ( < 1), this condition is
necessarily satised, and we can rule out this second deviation.
That leaves us with the third possible deviation. In this deviation, one party (i)
sets gi 6= g in the rst stage and chooses to ght in the second, while the other party
(j) sets gj = g. This deviation by the rst player (i) can be ruled out, if the income
when both players choose gi = g and settlement (y) is greater than the maximized
value of expected income under this deviation:
iY + 1




gi + g(1   )Y   gi

: (12)
In considering the optimizing choice of guns in this deviation (denoted by gd),
given the other party chooses gj = g, we rst suppose that  = 0. In this case,
the solution for g as shown in equation (10) indicates that gj = 0. But, then, the
optimizing deviation in the choice of guns by party i, gd, equals some innitesimal but
strictly positive level of guns (call it  > 0). For in the second stage upon rejecting the
settlement and having chosen gd =  in the rst stage, this party can seize all of the
insecure income not destroyed in the ght with probability equal to one. Nonetheless,
the deviating party's expected income in this case, given by
y
f
i (;0) = iY + (1   )Y   ;
will be strictly less than the income the player enjoys under settlement,
y

i (0;0) = iY + 1
2(1   )Y;
9provided that ghting is suciently destructive, or more precisely   1
2. However,
if  > 1
2, then we cannot rule out the deviation.
Now suppose that  > 0. In this case, player i's optimizing choice of guns in





(gi + g)2(1   )Y   1  0: (13)
This condition will be met as an inequality for gd = 0 and as a strict equality for
gd > 0. Using the solution for g as shown in equation (10) and imposing the
constraint that gi  0, the condition above implies the following solution for the







   )(1   )Y > 0 if 0 <  < 4;
0 if   4:
(14)
Note that when   4 implying that gd = 0, the optimized value of income under
this deviation equals iY . But since y

i (g;g) > iY from equation (4), we see that
the condition shown in equation (12) is always satised. Thus, we can immediately
rule out a deviation from the equilibrium with settlement when   4.
When  < 4, the solution in equation (14) implies that the condition to rule out




 +    1
2  0: (15)
Given the destructive eects of ghting (as negatively re
ected in the parameter ),
the left hand side of the above condition (denoted by D) decreases from D =   1
2 as 
increases from 0; when evaluated at  = , D reaches a minimum at D = 1
2( 1) < 0;





   1) < 0. Thus, if ghting is suciently destructive ( < 1
2), the
condition is satised for all  2 [0;1]. Accordingly, and consistent with our ndings
above, the \cross-my-heart" society, where  = 0 and thus g = 0, is sustainable as
an SPE. Otherwise, when  > 1
2, there exists a threshold value of  < , denoted by
^ , for which the condition is just satised (D = 0), and  ? ^  implies D 7 0. As one
10can verify, ^  satises the following
^   1   2
p
(1   ): (16)
The minimum value of  that can be sustained in an SPE with positive guns expen-
ditures, when  > 1
2, is strictly positive: ^  > 0. For values of  < ^ , this third
deviation cannot be ruled out, implying that the strategy of setting gi = gf in the
rst stage and choosing to ght in the second stage is the only SPE strategy.
Figure 1 brings these results together, showing in (;)-space when settlement
is an SPE. In particular, all values of  on and above the horizontal axis (up to
 = 1
2) and on or above the curve (equation (16) for  > 1
2) represent that part of
the parameter space for which settlement is an SPE.7 Of course, over this parameter
space, ghting is also an SPE. But, for  > 1
2, ghting is the only SPE for values of
 below the curve. Furthermore, as the gure shows, while settlement with  = 0
(\cross-my-heart") is not always a possible SPE, settlement with  =  (axiomatic
bargaining) and  = 1 (con
ict strength) are.
In general, we see how enforcement costs and incomes can vary widely across
dierent jurisdictions depending on the governance and norms that determine how
parties in actual or potential con
ict interact. Dierent levels of security costs are
consistent with widely dierent levels of overall security and incomes. Overall security
when two parties ght is simply , and that when the two parties settle is  + (1  
)(1   ) = 1   (1   ). Whether the two parties ght or settle, their arming is
decreasing in the respective measure of overall security. Now comparing two con
icts,
one in which the parties ght and the other in which the parties settle, we can nd
that the overall level of security for the two sets of parties k = 1 (ghting) and k = 2
(settling) is the same when 1 = 1   2(1   2); since  < 1, arming will be lower
for the two parties that ght, but expected income will be lower as well. Or we
could consider the set of parameters such that arming in the two con
icts is identical:
(1   1) = 2(1   2). This equality implies that overall security and income are
both higher for the two parties that settle.
7Notice the condition that  > 4, which gives gd = 0, plays no role in the gure. That is
because  > 4 is only possible if   1
4, and the condition that  < 1
2 is sucient to ensure that
settlement with any  2 [0;1] can be sustained as an SPE.
114 Endogenously Determined Governance
Next we turn to explore the endogenous determination of governance () under set-
tlement. Here we envision the contending parties as investing in governance as a
collective good that determines the value of , or the fraction of income Y that is
not under dispute. Such investment reduces the two parties' incentive to arm, given
norms (as re
ected in ).8 Accordingly, investment in governance, even if costly,
could be viewed as benecial to both parties.
Following McBride, Milante and Skaperdas (2011), we specify the \production"
of governance as  = (E), where E denotes the stock of accumulated investment
in building institutions of governance. This stock consists of two parts: (i) the pre-
existing stock inherited from the past, which we denote by E0, and (ii) additions to
the stock due to the current eorts or expenditures by the two parties, which we
denote by eA + eB. Assume that (E) is increasing in E (0 > 0), strictly concave
(00 < 0) and twice dierentiable. Of course, any increase in  would be re
ected in
an increase in A, B or both. To x ideas, we assume that investments in security












Analyzing the possibility of investment in governance by the two parties requires
that we extend the model back one stage. Specically, we suppose that the two parties
rst choose their level of investment and then proceed with the game studied in the
previous section. Investment is costly to both parties. Let  represent this cost per
unit of investment.
Income under settlement with investment in governance equals
y

i = i(eA + eB + E0)Y + 1
4[1   (eA + eB + E0)](2   )Y   ei; (17)
8Note that this indirect eect of investment in governance is operational whether the two parties
choose to ght or to settle peacefully. In addition, in the case that the two parties ght, the increase
in income that is not subject to dispute when the parties invest in security implies less overall
destruction. Indeed, as one can easily verify, the total marginal benet of an increase in  on each
side's expected income, assuming as we do below that the increase in  is equally distributed among
the two parties, is greater under ghting than under settlement. Thus, our focus on the case of
settlement reveals the lower bound of the two contending parties' incentive to invest in governance.
12for i = A;B. When evaluated at ei = ej = 0, this expression simplies as
y

i = i(E0)Y + 1
4[1   (E0)](2   )Y;







0(E0)Y    > 0; (18)
each party i will have an incentive to invest. The rst term shows the marginal
benet of such investment, while the second term represents the marginal cost, which
is increasing in .
At an interior optimum (i.e., where E > E0), these two terms are balanced against
one another. An increase in , all else the same, reduces the two parties' incentive
to invest. The marginal benet itself captures the eect of an increase in security
to reduce the two parties' incentive to arm, which is increasing in magnitude in Y .
Given the symmetry in the two parties' choices, the reduction in arming has no eect
on the relative division of the insecure portion of income, but of course increases the
income left for consumption.
Note further that norms in
uence this marginal benet. In particular, as  de-
creases such that guns play a smaller role in the division of insecure income under
settlement, the potential savings aorded by lowering equilibrium arming fall; as such,
the incentive to invest in governance falls. At an extreme, where norms alone sup-
port the \cross-my-heart" society ( = 0), the optimizing choice of investment equals
zero.9 But, when  > 0, the two parties might very well invest in governance.
Not surprisingly, however, when the parties choose their investments indepen-
dently there will generally be an underprovision of governance. To see this, consider





B(E) = Y + 1
2(1   )(2   )Y   (E   E0);
given the initial capital stock, E0. The welfare-maximizing choice of capital, denoted
9Of course, as shown above, this requires that ghting be suciently destructive.





0(E)Y    = 0 (19)
Given the concavity of (), a comparison of this equation with equation (18) shows
that E   E0 will be greater than the sum of the individual optimizing investment
choices by the two parties. As one can easily verify, the extent to which there is
underprovision of governance is larger, the larger is the number of parties there are
contesting Y .
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates how governance and norms together determine overall se-
curity, arming levels and the prevalence of con
ict. We present a simple model in
which governance quality is represented as a share of income that is secure for the
contending parties, and where norms are represented as dierent rules of division in
peaceful settlements. We nd that con
ict or ghting is always a possible equilibrium
outcome whenever governance is imperfect so that some income is contested. Equi-
libria with peaceful settlement sometimes, depending on the norms in place and the
degree of destruction that comes with ghting, also exist in the presence of imper-
fect governance. Indeed, the norms of Schelling's \cross-my-heart" society can even
be sustained in a self-enforcing peace, but only if ghting is suciently destructive.
When ghting is not suciently destructive and governance is imperfect, arming will
be unavoidable.
Of course, improving or strengthening the formal institutions and organizations
of governance would help to reduce such arming and the costs associated with it.
But, improving governance, not to mention establishing it in the rst place, is costly
itself, and any such costs incurred should be included in the measure of the costs of
enforcement. The individual contenders might choose to make costly investments in
governance, but the resulting provision is generally less than what is deemed to be
socially optimal.
Our formal analysis illuminates several avenues for further inquiry. One possi-
bility is to allow the parties to set the norms endogenously. We readily admit that
building norms is distinct from building institutions of governance, the latter often
14forming endogenously through intentional action and the former often emerging from
unintended actions. Norms in our simple framework, however, specically refer to
the terms of negotiated settlements, and there could be scope for the parties to agree
to explicit bargaining rules from which proposed settlements are derived.
A dierent direction is to consider additional contending parties (N > 2). As
N increases, the total amount of arming increases even when the prize Y remains
unchanged. A result is that settlement with  = 0 becomes less likely, and (as
mentioned above) the degree to which the parties collectively under provide security
(relative to the social optimum) increases. Thus, con
ict intensies on all margins as
more parties compete for the prize. Exploring the endogenous emergence of norms
becomes even more important in this setting.
Another direction of future work is to extend our single interaction analysis to a
repeated game setting. The common intuition is that settlement would be more likely
under repeated interaction because the parties can use threats of future punishment to
enforce settlements in the present. However, as previously shown (e.g., Garnkel and
Skaperdas, 2000; McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas, 2011; McBride and Skaperdas,
2011), the eects of ghting on future bargaining strength produces incentives that
yield an opposite eect. The role of norms in fostering settlements in this repeated
setting has not yet been studied.
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Figure 1: Combinations of  and  consistent with settlement as an SPE
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